America Should Stay in the Room. France International Space Summit
Washington has reasons to object to Europe’s emerging space policies. But leaving the table may give China an opportunity America does not need to create.
On September 9 and 10, representatives from around the world will gather in Paris for France’s International Space Summit, an ambitious meeting intended to bring together governments, scientists, astronauts and private industry to discuss the future of space.
I will be watching closely.
Not simply because of what happens inside the summit, but because of who will—and will not—be in the room.
The Trump administration has pressured several major American space companies to reconsider their participation. SpaceX, Blue Origin, Stoke Space and Starcloud subsequently withdrew. According to Reuters, American officials warned companies that attending could be interpreted as supporting European policy positions with which Washington disagrees. Some planned announcements between American and European companies were canceled as a consequence.
Washington has legitimate concerns.
Europe is increasingly explicit about its desire for technological sovereignty. The European Commission has proposed strengthening European space manufacturing and supply chains, reducing excessive dependence on non-EU capabilities and establishing conditions that would promote an EU preference when European institutions procure launch services.
France and Germany are also pushing for European sovereign satellite communications through IRIS² and treating access to radio-frequency spectrum as a strategic issue. In July, the two governments specifically called for ensuring IRIS² receives an adequate portion of Europe's 2 GHz mobile-satellite spectrum.
These policies have consequences for American companies.
SpaceX does not merely build rockets. Through Starlink and its launch business, it occupies an increasingly important position in the communications, security and physical infrastructure of the Western alliance. Policies designed to favor European launchers or European satellite networks can therefore affect both American commercial interests and American strategic influence.
The United States should make that case.
But it should make the case from inside the room.
Walking Away Is Not the Same as Winning
France says approximately 120 countries have been invited to the summit, including economic competitors. Organizers have specifically invited leading participants from both the United States and China.
That is precisely why American participation matters.
China does not need to persuade Europe to abandon its relationship with the United States. It does not need to replace America as Europe's principal security partner. It does not even need Europe to become particularly friendly toward Beijing.
A far more achievable outcome would be simply for Europe to become somewhat less dependent on America while becoming somewhat more willing to cooperate with China.
Europe is already moving toward greater strategic autonomy. France describes maintaining autonomous European access to space as an explicit objective of its national space strategy.
That does not make Europe anti-American.
It does, however, create an opening.
China can enter that conversation without asking Europe to choose sides. Beijing can support the language of sovereignty, multilateralism, international governance and technological independence. Where interests overlap, relationships can follow.
And relationships are what concern me most.
The Relationships That Did Not Have to Form
International summits are not important only because of the declarations issued at their conclusion.
They matter because people meet.
An executive meets a minister. An engineer meets another engineer. A European satellite company meets a Chinese supplier. A government official discovers a company capable of solving a problem. Someone suggests lunch. Someone exchanges a card. Someone says, We should talk again.
Nothing geopolitical appears to have happened.
Then those conversations continue.
A research collaboration follows. Perhaps a procurement relationship develops. Perhaps a company enters a new supply chain. Perhaps officials who previously viewed one another primarily as competitors discover an area in which cooperation is useful.
Years later, what looked like a conversation in a hallway has become infrastructure.
This is why I believe Washington risks overplaying its hand.
If the United States believes European policies discriminate against American companies, it should challenge them vigorously. If European spectrum policy disadvantages Starlink, American representatives should explain why. If European procurement rules unfairly exclude American launch companies, America should contest them.
But withdrawing some of America's most consequential commercial space companies does not prevent Europe from discussing those policies.
It simply means fewer Americans are present to influence the discussion.
America Has a Case to Make
There is also something peculiar about allowing the extraordinary success of American space companies to become an argument for their absence.
America has an extraordinarily strong story to tell.
The American commercial-space model has produced reusable rockets, dramatically reduced launch costs, enormous satellite constellations and an extraordinary relationship between private innovation and national capability.
SpaceX itself is evidence for the American argument.
Send it.
Let American executives explain why competitive markets matter. Let them challenge protectionism. Let them argue for interoperability. Let them explain the dangers of regulatory structures that could fragment allied space infrastructure.
Most importantly, let Europeans hear those arguments directly from Americans while they are also hearing arguments from China.
Diplomacy is not endorsement.
Sitting at a table does not mean surrendering your position. It gives you an opportunity to defend it.
Three Space Systems Are Emerging
The Paris dispute also points toward a larger transformation.
We may be watching three different models of space power emerge.
The American model relies heavily on extraordinary private companies whose commercial capabilities increasingly overlap with national-security infrastructure.
The European model increasingly emphasizes strategic autonomy, public investment, regulation, sovereign infrastructure and the deliberate cultivation of European industrial capacity.
The Chinese model more closely integrates state strategy, industrial development, technological capability and national power.
These systems will compete.
But they will also overlap.
The question is who will shape the points at which they meet.
And that is why the Paris summit matters far beyond whatever communiqué eventually emerges from it.
Who Gets to Shape the Rules?
France describes the summit as a forum for dialogue rather than a meeting intended to make binding policy or budget decisions.
That might make it sound less consequential.
I think it makes the relationships formed there more interesting.
Formal agreements are visible. Informal alignments are harder to see.
I will therefore be watching not only for what Europe says about America, but for how Europe talks to China.
I will be listening for words like sovereignty, autonomy, resilience, independence, spectrum, multilateralism and strategic dependence.
I will be watching which Chinese officials and companies participate, which European officials meet them, and whether any new commercial, scientific or governmental relationships emerge.
And I will be watching what happens after Paris.
Because the danger for the United States is not that Europe suddenly chooses China over America.
I consider that highly unlikely.
The danger is subtler.
America could become so confident in the strength of its technological and commercial position that it begins believing access to American capabilities gives Washington enough leverage to dictate the terms of engagement.
That is where leverage can become overreach.
Allies have alternatives. If they do not have them today, pressure can give them an incentive to build them tomorrow.
Europe is already doing exactly that.
The United States should defend American companies. It should challenge policies it believes discriminate against them. It should make the argument for American technology, American innovation and American leadership as forcefully as necessary.
But America should be there to make that argument.
Because when America leaves the room, the conversation does not stop.
Someone else gets to have it.
Disclosure: This article was developed by Ashley Greer in collaboration with ChatGPT. The author determined the argument, perspective and editorial conclusions; AI assisted with research, organization and drafting.