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Prepared for MetaFleurs | Research cutoff 2 October 2026
A country can possess a valuable coastline, productive mines and foreign-financed infrastructure while its people struggle to eat. Across the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa and the Congolese mineral belt, severe hunger coexists with assets that outside powers want to finance, operate or secure. Understanding that overlap requires following both the food and the money.
This report examines the six locations in the June 2026 FAO–WFP highest-concern group, updates the picture where newer assessments are available, and adds the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a major mineral and food-security case. The evidence establishes substantial foreign stakes. It does not, by itself, establish a coordinated strategy to manufacture starvation and acquire territory. [1–6, 9–10]
Figure 1. Regional orientation, not an IPC classification map. Shading identifies countries in the June outlook; it does not imply nationwide famine. Gaza is a point at this scale. The dashed Lobito connection is schematic. Boundaries are generalized and do not express a position on sovereignty. Sources [1–6, 15, 23, 27–29, 32, 36].
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Where the danger is greatest
“Mass starvation” is not a single forecasting category. IPC Phase 5 Catastrophe describes extreme deprivation among households. An area-level Famine classification requires additional evidence about food deprivation, malnutrition and deaths. A risk-of-famine warning describes a plausible deterioration, not a prediction that famine is inevitable. [1]
Location
Assessment and timing
Sudan
14 areas faced famine risk through September; the June outlook expected risk in 13 through January 2027. Nationwide February–May need was 19.5m. Later projections cover fewer areas. [1–2]
South Sudan
7.8m in Crisis or worse and roughly 73,000 in Catastrophe projected for April–July. Four counties faced famine risk. These are dated assessments, not an October census. [3]
Somalia
September update projects 5.4m in Crisis or worse in October–December, including nearly 26,000 Baidoa displaced people in Catastrophe; famine risk under a worse flooding scenario. [4]
Yemen
October–December projection: 5.4m in Crisis or worse in government-controlled areas only. The earlier 18.3m figure has broader coverage and cannot be substituted for this partial analysis. [1, 6]
Northeast Nigeria
June–August national CH projection: 34.8m in Crisis or worse; about 15,000 in Catastrophe in Borno. The extreme risk is geographically concentrated. [1]
Gaza
Newer IPC analysis projects 1.4m in Crisis or worse in July–December; area classification is Crisis. Gains are fragile, but the earlier famine-risk description is not the current classification. [5]
Figure 2. Dated scale comparison, not a ranking of famine probability or a synchronized October total. Navy bars cover earlier periods; rust bars extend into year end. Yemen covers government-controlled areas only. Sudan uses its nationwide baseline, not its smaller subsequent projection area. Sources [1–6].
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The Red Sea connects the cases
Ports give inland resources an international market. Shipping passages give distant producers access to buyers. Along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, the same geography also matters to food imports, humanitarian deliveries and military access. The map therefore needs both coastal infrastructure and the inland communities facing hunger.
Figure 3. Selected ports and locations, with a schematic maritime connection through Suez and Bab el-Mandeb. Points are approximate geographic anchors, not concession boundaries. Abu Amama is a cancelled proposal; a point does not imply an operating investment. Baidoa’s displaced communities are separate from the northern port developments. Sources [4, 12–21, 32, 36].
Djibouti provides a useful comparison. It hosts Chinese, American, French and other foreign military presences, alongside a port economy. IMF reporting connects its debt burden to railway, water and port infrastructure and describes relief on Chinese railway and water-project debt. Yet Djibouti is not among the June outlook’s six highest-concern hunger locations. Strategic importance and foreign access do not automatically produce famine. [1, 32–33]
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Sudan and South Sudan
Gold and oil link security to revenue
Sudan combines gold resources and Red Sea access with a war that has devastated food access. US Treasury findings in 2020 identified M Invest and its subsidiary Meroe Gold as part of Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s network. That documents a Russian-linked extractive and security relationship. It is not a transparent dollar valuation of Russia’s current investment stock, and this report does not treat it as one. [11]
A proposed Russian naval facility represents a different kind of stake. Reuters reported in February 2025 that the agreement remained on the table after talks in Moscow. A military-access negotiation can have strategic value before construction, but it should not appear on a map as an independently verified operating base. [12]
China’s petroleum involvement also requires dates. A December 2025 Sudan Tribune report described CNPC’s request to terminate its Sudan Block 6 production-sharing and pipeline agreements, citing force majeure. Historical Chinese oil investment cannot safely be treated as a uniform, uninterrupted operating portfolio across the two Sudans. The status of each field, pipeline and partnership matters. [35]
A large announcement is not a completed asset
The Abu Amama proposal illustrates the problem with headline investment totals. A UAE-linked consortium signed an initial $6 billion agreement in 2022. The proposed package joined Red Sea port development to a wider economic project. Subsequent reporting describes the deal’s cancellation by Sudan’s military-led authorities in 2024. The Financial Times also reported a separate $225 million Emirati–Sudanese agricultural venture covering 170,000 acres, launched in 2020. Neither the cancelled package nor a historical farm announcement proves present control of functioning assets. [13–14]
South Sudan’s financial relationship with China is more readily quantified. AidData records $4.8 billion across nine loans in its 2000–2023 dataset. Before BRI participation in 2018, almost all recorded 2013–2017 financing took the form of commodity prepayment arrangements; later commitments included roads such as the Juba–Terekeka–Yirol–Rumbek route. These are cumulative financing records, not an estimate of today’s outstanding debt or the value of Chinese-owned property. [9]
What the overlap can tell us
The analytical issue is whether resource revenue and infrastructure improve the state’s ability to feed its population, or instead become insulated from public welfare. Loans tied to commodities can constrain future revenue choices. Conflict can interrupt production, destroy farmland and prevent relief deliveries. Establishing who benefits requires tracing contracts and cash flows alongside access restrictions; a national map alone cannot resolve that question.
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Somalia and Yemen
Ports and new energy ambitions
DP World’s commitment of up to $442 million to Berbera is backed by visible project milestones: a new terminal opened in 2021, followed by the Berbera Economic Zone in 2023. Bosaso has a separate DP World upgrade agreement. These projects belong to different local political settings, and neither should be conflated with famine risk among displaced people in Baidoa farther south. [4, 15–17]
Turkey adds another type of foreign stake. In April 2026, its Cagri Bey vessel arrived off Mogadishu to launch an overseas deep-sea drilling project. Exploration establishes an operating commitment to search for hydrocarbons; it does not establish commercially recoverable reserves, sustained production or a disclosed total investment value. [18]
Israel’s Somaliland relationship is emerging and should be described precisely. In February, Somaliland’s president told Reuters that a trade agreement was still prospective and offered minerals, including lithium, to attract investment. In June, its defence minister reported Israeli training for police and military personnel while saying there was no Israeli base. Those reports establish diplomatic and security links, not a verified major Israeli mining or port investment. [19–20]
Yemen demonstrates the difference between pledges and finance
AidData records a roughly $508 million Chinese port-expansion pledge for Aden and Mokha in 2013. The loan agreement was never finalized because of Yemen’s security situation. Counting it as completed Chinese infrastructure would exaggerate the operational footprint. [21]
Saudi support has included a different financial instrument: the Saudi Press Agency reported that a $1 billion deposit was fully placed in Yemen’s central bank account in February 2023. A central-bank deposit can support financial capacity without creating foreign equity ownership of a port or mine. Its strategic relevance lies in the recipient government’s dependence on external financial support. [22]
Gaza belongs in the report on its own terms
Gaza’s food crisis must not be reduced to a minerals thesis. The newer IPC assessment credits humanitarian assistance with improvement while warning that weakened aid and exhausted livelihoods leave conditions fragile. Resource interests exist: Israel gave preliminary approval in 2023 to Gaza Marine gas development involving the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. That approval is not evidence of a completed project or proof that access to gas explains the conduct of the war. [5, 34]
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Nigeria and the Congolese mineral belt
Nigeria shows why national boundaries can mislead
Lekki Deep Sea Port is an operating asset on Nigeria’s southwestern coast. China Development Bank reported a $629 million loan facility, of which $395 million had been disbursed by the end of 2022. AidData identifies China Harbour Engineering’s indirect equity stake as 52.5 percent, alongside Tolaram, Lagos State and the Nigerian Ports Authority. Lending, ownership and construction are related but separate roles. [23–24]
The surrounding transport network is expanding. Reuters reported Nigeria’s approval of a $652 million China Exim road-financing package in May 2025, intended to connect Lekki, the Dangote refinery and its fertilizer complex to southern states. In January 2025, CDB separately released about $255 million for the Kano–Kaduna railway. These are distinct projects with different locations and financing stages. [25–26]
The most extreme hunger warning concerns Borno in the northeast. Lekki’s presence in the same country does not demonstrate that its investors control food access there. A serious test would examine internal transport, insecurity, food prices, state spending and whether infrastructure benefits reach the affected population. [1]
The DRC is a direct contest over minerals and export routes
The DRC sits in the June outlook’s very-high-concern category, separate from its six highest-concern locations. AidData records $22 billion across 112 Chinese loans through 2023 and describes critical minerals as central to the relationship. Copper and cobalt are critical industrial minerals; they should not be mislabeled as rare earths. [1, 10]
Corporate ownership provides a concrete measure of foreign stakes. CMOC reports an 80 percent interest in the Tenke Fungurume copper-cobalt mine and a 71.25 percent interest in Kisanfu. These percentages concern particular operating companies and assets, not ownership of the DRC’s entire mineral endowment. [27]
The United States is financing an alternative route to market. DFC committed up to $553 million to the Lobito Atlantic Railway, with financial close announced in December 2025. The project supports the mineral port at Lobito and roughly 1,300 kilometres of existing railway across Angola to Luau. South Africa’s DBSA is a co-financier; Trafigura and Portugal’s Mota-Engil are participants. The wider corridor connects the DRC and Zambia to an Atlantic outlet. EU–Angola cooperation also identifies Lobito as a Global Gateway priority. [28–30]
This geography again needs precision. Southern copper-cobalt operations and the Atlantic export route are not identical to eastern Congo’s conflict and hunger geography. An investor’s national footprint is the starting point for a causal investigation, not its conclusion.
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How to read the investment figures
Figure 4. Selected headline amounts, not total foreign investment or verified spending. Lekki is a loan facility, Lobito a signed loan, Berbera an investment commitment, and Aden–Mokha an unfinalized pledge. Abu Amama is a cancelled multi-sector package on a separate scale. Amounts refer to different years and are not inflation-adjusted. Do not sum them. Sources [13–15, 21, 23, 28–29].
China has the broadest documented combination of lending and infrastructure in this selection. AidData’s CPORTS 2.0 research tracks nearly $24 billion in state-directed loans and grants supporting 168 overseas ports during 2000–2025. This is a global financing dataset, not an African ownership register. It also records commitments associated with Haifa and Ashdod in Israel, illustrating that commercial networks cross geopolitical alignments. The Belt and Road Initiative has no single completion date established by these records. [31]
Russia’s documented stakes here are more closely tied to extractive networks and security access. The UAE combines port operations with agricultural and other commercial projects. US financing, European participation and South African co-finance converge around Lobito. Turkey’s Somali project is exploration, while Israel’s documented Somaliland relationship includes training and prospective economic cooperation. These different instruments cannot be ranked reliably by adding a few headline dollar amounts.
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What this means for hunger and power
The strongest conclusion is that access infrastructure can create bargaining power over countries whose food systems are already fragile. A port operator can influence logistics; a creditor can shape financial choices; a buyer with an exclusive offtake contract can constrain where a commodity is sold. Whether those relationships are beneficial, coercive or both depends on terms, alternatives and local accountability.
Food can exist and still remain out of reach
FAO’s June outlook described global cereal production prospects as historically high. Severe local deprivation can coexist with that supply because people need income, functioning markets and physical access to food. In April, the World Bank forecast 2026 energy prices rising 24 percent and fertilizer prices 31 percent, including a 60 percent rise for urea. These are dated forecasts, not measured full-year outcomes. Higher input and transport costs can transmit distant conflict into domestic food prices and future planting decisions. [7–8]
This helps explain why mines, docks, railways and agricultural land belong in the same investigation. An export railway may generate revenue and move food, but its benefits depend on freight access, pricing and connections to local markets. Farmland can support local food supply or export crops. Port investment can improve delivery capacity without solving household poverty or wartime restrictions.
The hypothesis requires evidence of a mechanism
Deliberate starvation and opportunistic investment are questions that can be investigated. To establish that an outside actor engineered hunger to obtain assets, evidence would need to connect its actions to food deprivation and then to a specific acquisition or concession. Useful records would include orders, financing of obstructing forces, ownership changes, distressed valuations and communications connecting the two. The existence of hungry populations near valuable resources does not supply those missing links.
The cases here also show costs to investors: cancelled port agreements, unfinished loans and threatened petroleum operations. Conflict may generate opportunities for some actors while destroying the investments of others. Any claim about “who benefits” must identify the actor, the transaction and the time period.
What governments and investors should be asked
Does a concession reserve capacity for food imports and local producers? Are fees and beneficial ownership public? Do resource revenues fund domestic services? Do creditors protect essential food and health spending during restructuring? Can aid reach communities even when commercial traffic continues? These questions translate a broad geopolitical concern into records and decisions that can be scrutinized.
A strategically valuable country can still fail to provide food for its people. The public-interest test is whether its infrastructure and resource agreements improve that capacity, who captures the revenue when they do not, and who has the power to change the terms.
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Methods and sources
This is a selected-case report, not a census of every foreign investment. It combines humanitarian assessments, public financing records, corporate disclosures and attributed reporting available by 2 October 2026. Dates attach to each source and figure; older evidence is not presented as a new October measurement. Source numbers in the article and captions refer to the linked list below.
No investment total is calculated across countries or powers. Loans, deposits, equity interests, project costs and announcements are different measures. Project status is described at the latest verified source date, which may precede the research cutoff. Unknown values are left unquantified. The maps use Natural Earth boundaries and approximate location anchors; they are analytical orientation maps rather than official famine maps or surveyed infrastructure alignments.
[1] FAO and WFP. Hunger Hotspots outlook release. 17 Jun 2026.
[2] IPC. Sudan analysis and coverage limitations. 14 May 2026.
[3] IPC. South Sudan famine risk and acute hunger. 2026.
[4] IPC. Somalia July to December assessment. 23 Sep 2026.
[5] IPC. Gaza food security gains and continuing fragility. 2026.
[6] IPC. Yemen government controlled areas analysis. 2026.
[7] FAO. Food Outlook and commodity market risks. 18 Jun 2026.
[8] World Bank. Commodity Markets Outlook release. 28 Apr 2026.
[9] AidData. South Sudan Chinese development finance profile. 28 May 2026.
[10] AidData. DRC Chinese development finance profile. 28 May 2026.
[11] US Treasury. M Invest and Meroe Gold sanctions findings. 15 Jul 2020.
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Sources continued
[12] Reuters. Russian Red Sea base deal still on the table. 12 Feb 2025.
[13] Reuters. Sudan initial Abu Amama port agreement. 13 Dec 2022.
[14] Financial Times. The UAE’s imperial push into Africa. Sep 2026.
[15] DP World. Berbera terminal opening and expansion commitment. 2021.
[16] DP World. Berbera Economic Zone opening. 2023.
[17] DP World. Bosaso upgrade construction agreement. 2022.
[18] Reuters. Turkey launches Somalia deep sea drilling mission. 10 Apr 2026.
[19] Reuters. Somaliland seeks Israeli trade and minerals deal. 3 Feb 2026.
[20] Reuters. Somaliland reports Israeli military training but no base. 17 Jun 2026.
[21] AidData. Aden and Mokha unfinalized port loan pledge. Project 41200.
[22] Saudi Press Agency. One billion dollar Yemen central bank deposit. 21 Feb 2023.
[23] China Development Bank. Lekki opening and loan disbursement. 10 Feb 2023.
[24] AidData. Lekki financing and ownership. Project 85628.
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Sources continued
[25] Reuters. Nigeria approves China Exim road finance package. 6 May 2025.
[26] Reuters. Kano Kaduna rail loan release. 8 Jan 2025.
[27] CMOC. DRC copper and cobalt operations and ownership. Company overview accessed 2 Oct 2026.
[28] DFC. Lobito financing commitment. 4 Dec 2024.
[29] DFC. Lobito loan financial close. 17 Dec 2025.
[30] Council of the European Union. EU Angola joint way forward. 26 Feb 2026.
[31] AidData. Anchoring Global Ambitions and CPORTS 2.0. Mar 2026.
[32] World Bank. Djibouti country overview. Accessed 2 Oct 2026.
[33] IMF. Djibouti Article IV consultation. 2025.
[34] Reuters. Gaza Marine preliminary development approval. 18 Jun 2023.
[35] Sudan Tribune. CNPC request to terminate Sudan oil agreements. 9 Dec 2025.
[36] Natural Earth. Admin 0 countries at 1 to 110 million scale. Public domain basemap.