In May, I Asked Whether Russia Was Running Out the Clock. Now I Am Nervous.

“Appear weak when you are strong, and strong when you are weak.” — Sun Tzu

In May, after watching Russia's unusually restrained 81st Victory Day Parade, I wrote an article asking whether Sun Tzu might have appreciated what Vladimir Putin was doing.

My argument was contrary to much of the conventional interpretation.

Russia looked weaker.

I wondered whether that was precisely what Russia wanted us to believe.

More importantly, I wondered whether the West was looking at the war in Ukraine through the wrong clock.

What if one of Moscow's strategic objectives was simply to keep the clock running?

Every additional month requires Ukraine to consume weapons, ammunition and increasingly precious air-defense interceptors supplied in large part by the United States and its allies.

Russia does not necessarily have to defeat America to weaken America's military position.

It can allow America to spend.

Three months later, I am considerably more nervous about that possibility.

Where Were the Weapons?

Russia's May 9 Victory Day Parade was conspicuously restrained.

There were no tanks or other heavy military vehicles rolling through Red Square. Instead, many of Russia's most formidable systems appeared on giant screens: strategic missiles, advanced air defenses, submarines, drones and aircraft.

There were perfectly reasonable explanations. Russia was fighting a war. Ukrainian drones had demonstrated an ability to strike deep inside Russian territory. Concentrating valuable military equipment in Moscow created unnecessary risk.

But as I watched, I kept asking myself:

Where are the weapons?

Were they depleted?

Were they being protected?

Were they already being used in Ukraine?

Or—and this was the possibility that made me uncomfortable—was some of that equipment already in position somewhere else?

I had no evidence then that Russia had secretly positioned weapons for another operation, and I have none now.

But I wondered whether we were making a potentially dangerous analytical mistake: seeing what Russia chose not to show and assuming we knew why it wasn't there.

Russia still made sure its audience saw images of advanced capabilities.

The physical spectacle was restrained while the message of capability remained.

What if Russia was comfortable allowing us to underestimate it?

The Other Attrition War

Ukraine is usually described as a war of attrition between Russia and Ukraine.

But there is another attrition contest behind it.

The industrial one.

Every interceptor fired has to be replaced. Every artillery shell has to be manufactured. Every missile transferred from an American or European inventory eventually has to be replenished.

America possesses extraordinary military power, but its magazines are not infinite and factories cannot instantly replace sophisticated weapons.

Russia can observe what systems we transfer, how quickly we manufacture replacements, how much they cost and what happens when American resources are simultaneously required somewhere else.

Russia is also expending enormous resources. But if Moscow believes it can replenish and endure longer than the West is politically or industrially prepared to do, then the relevant question isn't simply who loses more equipment.

It is:

Whose clock runs out first?

China Changes the Clock

This is where China changes the equation.

Russia and China are not formal military allies in the NATO sense. But China has become extraordinarily important to Russia's defense-industrial base, supplying dual-use components and industrial inputs that help Russian weapons production continue despite Western sanctions.

In my opinion, that gives Russia reason to be less concerned about diminishing stockpiles than we might assume.

Russia can fire a missile and worry about replacing it.

America can fire a missile and worry about replacing it.

But Russia has access to the enormous Chinese manufacturing ecosystem behind it.

Even more importantly, China occupies critical positions inside everyone else's supply chains too.

China dominates important portions of global rare-earth processing and permanent-magnet production—materials and components essential to modern electronics, aerospace and defense manufacturing—and Beijing has already demonstrated a willingness to restrict exports of strategically important materials.

That creates an extraordinary potential asymmetry.

China can help keep Russian production moving while possessing leverage over portions of the supply chain America and its allies need to replenish their own equipment.

I am not arguing that Beijing and Moscow are secretly coordinating these two levers as part of a master attrition strategy. There is no public evidence establishing that.

But when we ask whose stockpile runs out first, we should also ask:

Who controls the factories, components and materials necessary to refill those stockpiles?

Russia's smaller economy may suggest its hourglass should empty first.

But what if China is standing beside Russia with another bag of sand?

And what if China simultaneously has its hand around portions of the supply chain we need to refill ours?

Russia Gives China Geography

Then there is the Arctic.

I recently wrote about America's vulnerabilities there, but the region looks even more important when placed on this larger strategic map.

Russia possesses something China wants and geography cannot manufacture: enormous Arctic frontage and control over much of the infrastructure supporting the Northern Sea Route.

Russia is increasingly opening that corridor to Chinese commerce, while Moscow and Beijing are expanding cooperation intended to make Arctic shipping more competitive.

For China, this offers another connection between Asia and Europe and potentially reduces dependence on traditional maritime chokepoints.

For Russia, China provides markets, manufacturing capacity and a massive customer for Russian resources.

The exchange is strikingly complementary:

Russia gives China geography. China gives Russia industrial depth.

And together they are developing logistical and economic relationships that can reduce their vulnerability to systems traditionally dominated by the United States and its allies.

The Arctic therefore isn't simply another potential battlefield.

It is becoming another supply line.

Then the CIA Director Went to Moscow

On August 25, CIA Director John Ratcliffe made a rare trip to Moscow.

According to subsequent reporting, Ratcliffe warned Russian officials against attacking NATO amid American intelligence concerns that Moscow could attempt some form of limited test of the alliance. Iran was reportedly discussed as well.

President Trump described the trip as “semi-routine.”

Perhaps it was.

But the historical comparison is difficult to ignore. William Burns traveled to Moscow in November 2021 as the United States warned Putin against invading Ukraine.

That does not mean Russia is preparing to invade NATO.

But I want to know what Washington is sufficiently concerned about that the director of the CIA needed to carry the message personally.

Even more troubling, recent U.S. intelligence reportedly assesses that Putin sees America's war with Iran as having weakened the United States and potentially created an opportunity for Russia to increase pressure against American interests and allies in Europe.

That comes uncomfortably close to the question I was asking in May:

What happens when Russia believes America's attention and military resources are stretched somewhere else?

Five Days of Pressure

At the same time, Russia has subjected Kyiv and its surrounding region to five consecutive days of drone attacks.

Ukraine says Russia launched approximately 1,500 drones over four days, around 800 of them jet-powered.

The attacks have created nearly continuous air-raid warnings and forced Ukraine to continue expending defensive resources.

A drone does not necessarily have to reach its target to impose a cost.

If it forces the defender to launch an interceptor, divert personnel and expend limited defensive capacity, it has accomplished something even when it is destroyed.

That is attrition.

And Ukraine isn't the only place demanding American resources.

Iran Opens Another Meter

On August 30, American forces struck Iranian missile launchers on Larak Island in the Strait of Hormuz after U.S. Central Command said Iranian forces were preparing to deploy sea mines threatening shipping.

Iran retaliated against American military targets in the region.

Now look at the strategic map from Moscow or Beijing rather than Washington.

The United States wants to continue supporting Ukraine.

It wants to deter Russia from testing NATO.

It must protect American forces and allies in the Middle East.

It must protect global shipping.

And throughout all of this, it must preserve sufficient capability to deter China in the Indo-Pacific.

These are not separate universes.

They draw, to varying degrees, from the same industrial base, military personnel, intelligence infrastructure, political attention and defense budget.

What If Running the Clock Was the Strategy?

I am not arguing that Russia controls Iran.

I am not arguing that Moscow and Beijing orchestrated the crises confronting Washington.

And Russia's Victory Day Parade certainly does not prove the existence of a secret master plan.

My argument is simpler:

Russia benefits when American military resources are divided.

If Moscow believes that time progressively creates more of those divisions, then time itself becomes a weapon.

Keep Ukraine fighting.

Keep Western weapons flowing.

Watch American inventories.

Watch another crisis emerge in the Middle East.

Watch resources move.

Watch NATO debate what it can supply.

Watch Europe struggle to rebuild its defense-industrial base.

And wait.

China does not even have to participate directly to benefit.

It can watch which American weapons are consumed, how quickly they are replaced, how our air defenses perform, how our alliances respond and what America leaves uncovered when its attention shifts elsewhere.

Meanwhile, China can support Russia's industrial base, maintain leverage over critical supply chains and expand its access to an Arctic shipping corridor through Russia.

Our adversaries do not need to be following one perfectly coordinated master plan for each to benefit from pressures created by the others.

I Am Nervous

That is why I am nervous about what is on the horizon.

Too many pressure points are becoming active simultaneously.

Russia is demonstrating that it can continue generating enormous numbers of drones.

Ukraine is consuming defensive resources.

The CIA director has made a rare trip to Moscow amid concern about NATO.

American intelligence reportedly believes Putin sees the Iran war as an opportunity created by American distraction.

The United States and Iran are again exchanging military fire.

China continues supporting Russia's industrial base while occupying critical positions in global manufacturing and mineral supply chains.

And Russia and China are developing an increasingly important Arctic relationship.

Any one of these problems may be manageable.

The danger lies in their convergence.

America Needs a Strategy for the Whole Board

Someone needs to figure out a new strategy quickly.

Not another response.

A strategy.

If Russia's objective includes running down the clock while degrading Western capacity, then measuring success principally by whether Ukraine survives another month risks accepting Moscow's chosen game.

America needs to change the economics of that game.

We need greater munitions and interceptor production, resilient supply chains, reliable sources of rare earths and permanent magnets outside China, greater European responsibility for conventional defense and sufficient preserved capacity for the Indo-Pacific.

Most importantly, we need to stop treating Ukraine, Russia, Iran, China and the Arctic as unrelated briefing books.

They are increasingly connected by the same things:

Weapons. Manufacturing. Energy. Shipping. Resources. Geography. Time.

In May, I sat watching Russia's strangely modest Victory Day Parade and kept asking myself:

Where are the weapons?

Three months later, I still don't know.

Maybe Russia was protecting them.

Maybe they were needed in Ukraine.

Maybe Russia really was weaker than it wanted the world to know.

But I also wondered whether some were already positioned for whatever Moscow believed might come next.

I had no evidence for that possibility then, and I have none now.

But the larger question remains.

Were we watching a weakened Russia?

Or were we watching a Russia willing to look weak while waiting for the strategic environment to become more favorable?

Russia has resources and geography.

China has manufacturing capacity and critical supply chains.

Russia gives China access to the Arctic.

China gives Russia industrial depth.

Meanwhile, America is attempting to sustain Ukraine, deter Russia, confront Iran, protect global commerce, rebuild its industrial base and remain ready for China.

That brings me back to Sun Tzu:

“Appear weak when you are strong, and strong when you are weak.”

Russia may indeed be weaker than it wants the world to believe.

But there is another possibility we cannot afford to dismiss:

Russia may be stronger than we want to believe—and may have understood that one of the most valuable American weapons to destroy is sometimes the one Russia can persuade us to fire.

That is what makes me nervous about what comes next.

Author’s Disclosure: This article revisits the author's May 2026 essay, “Did Sun Tzu Plan Russia's 81st Victory Day Parade?” and develops arguments first advanced there: that Russia's apparent restraint could obscure greater underlying capacity and that prolonging the war in Ukraine may carry strategic value by consuming Western military resources and testing Western industrial and political endurance. The author's questions about the location of Russian military assets, strategic patience, Western munitions expenditure, China's industrial relationship with Russia and the strategic significance of the Arctic originated with the author. AI was used as a research, editorial, organizational and critical-analysis tool to examine subsequent developments, test the thesis against alternative explanations, verify current reporting, and assist with drafting and refinement. Where the article moves beyond established facts into strategic interpretation, it is presented as the author's analysis rather than established intelligence. Because the geopolitical events discussed are rapidly developing, factual claims were checked against current reporting at the time of writing. The author retains responsibility for the finished work.